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ABSTRACT.  The exit process has been largely ignored in business angel research.. The 
practitioner community identifies the difficulty in achieving exits as the most pressing 
problem for investors. This has been attributed to the failure of investors to adopt an exit-
centric approach to investing. The validity of this claim is examined via a study of the 
investment approach of 21 ‘gatekeepers’ (managers) of angel groups in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. Most gatekeepers say that they do consider the exit when they invest. 
However, this is contradicted by a verbal protocol analysis which indicates that the exit is 
not a significant consideration in their initial screening process. The small number of 
exits achieved by the groups is consistent with the general lack of an exit-centric 
approach to investing. Only three groups exhibit evidence of a strong exit-centric 
approach to investing. The lack of exits may have a negative impact on the level of future 
angel investment activity. 
 
Key words: business angels, angel groups, exits, investment screening, verbal protocol 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The core of the entrepreneurial process is the creation of financial value. Yet, compared 
to the emphasis that has been given to the start-up, scholars have devoted remarkably 
little attention to the exit process, and specifically to the harvest event where the 
financial value that has been created is extracted.  Many studies have equated exits with 
failure and so have only considered businesses that cease trading involuntarily. Where 
the harvest event has been considered this has typically been in the context of an IPO 
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(often linked to venture capital investments), with such studies adopting a narrowly 
financial perspective. In recent years this omission has started to be addressed (DeTienne, 
2010; DeTienne and Cardon, 2012; Wennberg et al, 2010; Wennberg and DeTienne, 
2014). This literature has adopted an entrepreneur-centric view of the exit, defining it as 
“the process by which the founders of privately held companies leave the firms that they 
helped to create” (DeTienne and Cardon, 2012: 353). Three situations are identified in 
which exits occur: (i) when the firm ceases trading for financial reasons (e.g. 
bankruptcy), (ii) when a firm is acquired and subsumed into another organization, and 
(iii) when a founder leaves an on-going business (e.g. through family succession, sale of 
the business or forced departure) (DeTienne and Wennberg, 2013). Meanwhile, the 
individuals involved in any of these situations may continue as entrepreneurs by starting 
or buying another business.  
 
An important limitation of these studies is their conceptualisation of the exit decision and 
exit process as revolving around the entrepreneur. But an entrepreneur-centric view of 
the exit is inappropriate in cases where businesses have raised finance from business 
angels and venture capital funds.  These investors are making equity-based investments 
for capital gain and therefore require a harvest event to realize this financial return: 
venture capital funds need to return the cash to their limited partners while angels need 
liquidity to be able to make further investments. Hence, for these businesses it is not ‘if’ 
but ‘when’ an exit will occur. The key distinguishing feature of these exits is that both 
the investor and the entrepreneur will be involved; indeed the investor may take the lead 
in developing an exit strategy, managing the exit process and determining its timing. The 
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actual exit process normally involves all of the shareholders in the business – both 
internal (e.g. entrepreneur(s), senior management team and in some cases employees) 
and external investors - selling their entire shareholdings , typically via the sale of the 
business to another company (a trade sale). This can be either a one-off process or staged 
over a period of time. The entrepreneur might leave the company immediately or may be 
required by the new owner to work in the acquired business for a period of time. 
 
Although investor-led exits are only a small subset of all entrepreneurial exits they are 
significant for several reasons. First, the fact that they have previously raised investment 
and have now attracted a buyer signals that these are high growth potential businesses 
which have already achieved some level of growth. Second, exits enable angel groups 
and venture capital funds to attract further investors by demonstrating their ability to 
make a financial return.  Third, they provide investors with both the financial liquidity 
and the motivation to make further investments. Conversely, a lack of exits constrains 
the re-investment process through its adverse impacts on investor liquidity and 
motivation. Fourth, exits are likely to set off a process of entrepreneurial recycling in 
which members of the entrepreneurial team will reinvest their newly acquired wealth, 
along with their accumulated experience and time in other entrepreneurial activities, 
including starting another company, becoming an investor in young businesses, 
mentoring and involvement in entrepreneurial support organisations (Mason and 
Harrison, 2006). And finally, with the growth in public sector co-investment funds which 
invest alongside private investors, the need for exits is now also an issue for government. 
In short, the ability of investors to achieve exits is a major determinant of the vibrancy of 
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entrepreneurial ecosystems (Mason and Brown, 2014). For all these reasons, investor-led 
exits should be included in the emerging entrepreneurial exits research agenda 
(DeTienne and Wennberg, 2013). 
 
Our focus in this paper is on business angels - high net worth individuals who invest 
their own money, either alone or with others, directly in unquoted businesses in which 
there is no family connection.  It is now widely accepted that business angels play a 
critical role in financing the early stages of growing businesses (Mason and Harrison, 
2000; Sohl, 2012). They have become an even more significant source of funding for 
entrepreneurial businesses in recent years as a result of the contraction in venture capital 
investing and decline in bank lending (Mason and Harrison, 2011; 2015).   
 
There is growing concern amongst angel investors that exits have become harder to 
achieve since the technology crash of the early 2000s (Waddell, 2013). This has two 
dimensions. First, there are simply fewer exits. As one experienced angel has observed, 
“the overall impression when talking to Angels around the world is that they have 
become frustrated with the lack of successful exits or liquidity events, resulting in them 
not receiving the return on their investments they hoped for”  (Gray, 2011).  Second, 
those exits which do occur are taking longer to achieve. John Waddell, manager of 
Archangels, which claims to be the oldest functioning angel group in the world, observed 
in evidence to a Scottish Parliamentary Committee that “in 2005 the average time 
between investing and existing for early stage companies was about three years; it is now 
10 years or more … There has been an exit drought” (Waddell, 2013: col. 3697).  The 
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same problem has been highlighted by the National Angel Capital Association of Canada 
in its most recent investment report (NACO, 2014: 44). “A main challenge for a number 
of angel groups is the length of time to exit. Long investment time horizons restrict the 
Angels’ ability to reinvest in new companies. The lack of fund circulation means groups 
must recruit new members in order to remain active. Much of the Angel group managers’ 
time is spent seeking new membership in an attempt to address investor fatigue”. 
 
The low rate of exits is attributed by Gray (2011) to the failure of the angel community to 
build the exit into their investment appraisal. He ascribes this attitude to two beliefs that 
he argues are widely held by angels. First is the belief that “good investments will always 
find exits”.  This view has been articulated by the prominent entrepreneur, venture 
capitalist and angel investor Luke Johnson (2012) who has stated that “if the business 
works you will be spoilt with choice of exit”. Angels who hold this view would not see 
any need to consider exit possibilities at the investment stage nor would they seek to 
pursue an exit strategy after the investment had been made.  The second belief is that it is 
inappropriate to discuss exits with entrepreneurs prior to investing or to actively pursue 
exits post-investment as somehow this puts the entrepreneur and the investor on an 
unequal basis. Johnson (2012) has argued that it is off-putting to the entrepreneur who is 
passionate about their business to be asked about the exit in their first conversation with a 
prospective investor. However, this approach to investing has been claimed to reduce the 
prospects of achieving a successful exit. First, it increases the risk that investments will 
be made in companies for which there are no prospective acquirers. Second, those exits 
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which do occur will be opportunistic and therefore fewer than if a strategic approach to 
the exit was adopted.  
 
In this paper we use verbal protocol analysis to examine the validity of the claim that the 
managers of angel groups – often termed gatekeepers - are not sufficiently exit-centric in 
their approach to investing on a sample of gatekeepers of angel groups in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. We find that only a small minority of groups give significant 
consideration to the exit at the initial screening stage. This is consistent with the small 
number of exits that the groups have achieved. 
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The business angel literature reflects in microcosm the criticism of the wider 
entrepreneurship literature that exits have been ignored. The emphasis is on the process 
of making investments, with much of the research focusing on the investment decision-
making of business angels (e.g. van Osnabrugge, 2000; Mason and Harrison, 1996; 
Mason and Rogers, 1997; Feeney et al, 1999; Mason and Stark, 2004; Riding et al, 1993; 
Clark, 2008) and on the types of investments that they have made (Mason and Harrison, 
2010; 2011).  Angels typically subject opportunities to a two-stage decision-making 
process comprising a selection stage – or initial screen -  in which investors decide 
whether they are interested in the opportunity and wish to give it more detailed 
consideration, and the post-selection stage which involves a more thorough assessment 
of the opportunity (Maxwell et al, 2011). The emphasis at the initial screening is on 
tangible, objective criteria (Brush et al, 2012), notably investor fit, market and 
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entrepreneur (Mason and Rogers, 1997). A high proportion  of the deal flow – anywhere 
from 70% to 90% - is rejected at this stage (Riding et al, 1993; Carpentier and Suret, 
2013). The decision-making is made on a non-compensatory basis (Maxwell et al, 2011), 
with rejection being based on the accumulation of perceived deficiencies (Mason and 
Rogers, 1997).
1
 The remaining opportunities are then subject to some form of due 
diligence. At this stage in the decision-making less quantifiable items and intangibles 
become important (Brush et al, 2012), notably people factors, specifically the personal 
qualities of the management team (e.g. trustworthiness, capability for hard work, 
coachability) and a judgement on their capability to successfully exploit the opportunity 
(Feeney et al, 1999). Rejection at this stage is generally based on one or two fundamental 
issues (Mason and Harrison, 1996). In those cases where the angel wants to make the 
investment investigation would normally be undertaken to verify all material facts 
(Mason and Harrison, 1996). If nothing negative emerges from that stage the angel will 
then seek to negotiate the terms and conditions of an investment. Central to this process 
is the valuation of the business. 
 
The picture that emerges from these studies is that business angels give very little 
thought to the exit in either their investment appraisal or post-investment involvement, 
do not have clear exit plans at the time of investing and are relaxed about the timing of 
the exit (Wetzel, 1981; Gaston, 1989; Harrison and Mason, 1992; Landström, 1993; 
Mason and Harrison, 1994; Lumme et al, 1998; Maxwell et al, 2011).  Indeed, in one 
                                                 
1
 Interestingly, in the UK version of Dragon’s Den 58% of ‘deals’ that were agreed on-screen subsequently 
fell through. The main reasons were, first, the subsequent research identified problems that had not been 
recognized at the initial pitch, second, that the business had received funding from another source, and third, 
that the motivation of the entrepreneur to appear on the programme was to seek publicity for their business 
(Real Deals, 2013; Financial Times, 2013).  
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study, ‘potential exit routes’ was ranked 24th (out of 27) investment criteria by angels 
(Van Osnabrugge and Robinson, 2000).  There is also no evidence in studies of the post-
involvement of angels in their investee business that preparing the business for an exit is 
one of their value-added contributions. Indeed, this activity was not mentioned in any of 
the studies reviewed by Politis (2008). However, Collewaert (2012) notes that the 
investor’s intention to exit may be a source of conflict with the entrepreneur. 
 
There has also been very little discussion of the outcomes of the investments or what 
influences such outcomes. There are no studies of the exit process and only a handful of 
studies which have examined the investment returns of business angels (Lumme et al, 
1998; Mason and Harrison, 2002; Wiltbank and Boeker, 2007; Wiltbank et al, 2009; 
Wiltbank, 2009; Roach, 2010; Vo, 2013). Wiltbank’s studies suggest that higher returns 
are associated with greater time spent doing due diligence and greater interaction with 
investee companies (Wiltbank and Boeker, 2007; Wiltbank, 2009). However, there is no 
evidence whether a pro-active approach to exit by the angel has an influence on returns. 
 
Venture capital funds, in contrast, are much more concerned than angels about exiting 
their investments (van Osnabrugge, 2000). They typically raise their money in the form 
of a 10 year fund and so need to invest in, and exit from, their investee businesses within 
this period, normally in around five years, in order to be able to return profits to the 
investors in the fund and demonstrate a successful investment track-record to raise a 
further fund. This requires the exit to be planned and managed. Moreover, they have a 
portfolio approach to investing and so are seeking to maximize returns to the fund which 
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typically is achieved by one or two very successful exits. As a rule of thumb, all of the 
returns come from 10%-20% of investments (Peters, 2009; Zider, 1998). This, in turn, 
encourages a “swing for the fences” approach to investing in which the emphasis is on 
achieving large exits, typically through an IPO. These have been shown to generate 
superior returns and as well as providing reputational benefits (Söderblom and Wiklund, 
2006). However, they account for only a minority of venture capital exits (less than 
20%). The venture capital literature therefore gives more prominence to the exit, largely 
based on the statistical analyses of databases, albeit with a disproportionate emphasis on 
the IPO process (e.g. Espenlaub et al, 1999; Gompers, 206; Dolvin and Pyles, 2006; 
Bessler and Seim, 2012; Lerner et al, 2012). Angels are much less likely than venture 
capital funds to exit via an IPO (Johnson and Sohl, 2012; Carpentier and Suret, 2014). 
Exit considerations feature in relatively few studies of the investment decision-making of 
venture capital funds (e.g. Kollman and Kuckertz, 2009) and their value-added 
contributions (Large and Muegge, 2008).  
 
It may have been appropriate in the past for angels to take a relaxed view of exits. Angel 
activity was more of a hobby activity, angels were making fewer investments and 
investing less money and personal reasons for investing were more important, notably 
the excitement of being involved in a new venture or investing in ‘hot buttons’ (Wetzel, 
1981), from which psychic income was derived. In addition, the existence of a stronger 
funding escalator meant that there was greater likelihood that an angel-backed business 
would go on to attract follow-on funding from a venture capital fund (Freear and Wetzel, 
1990) which, in turn, would manage the exit. However, the emergence of managed angel 
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groups (Mason, 2006; Sohl, 2007; 2012; Gregson et al, 2013; Mason et al, 2013) and 
various fee-based intermediaries offering ‘packaged’ investment opportunities has 
increased the emphasis on the need for an exit. Angel groups operate more 
professionally, with a more formal process of assessing opportunities. There is a more 
arms-length relationship with investee businesses and hence less likelihood of 
developing an emotional attachment to investments (Ibrahim, 2008).  For both reasons 
there is less opportunity to derive psychic income. Moreover, angel groups are investing 
more frequently, making bigger investments, are less reliant on venture capital funds for 
follow-on investment and hence are more likely to fund a business to an exit. They also 
need exits both to provide their members with the liquidity to make new investments and 
to attract new investors. Fee-based intermediaries need to demonstrate that the 
investment opportunities they offer their members are capable of generating good 
financial returns.  
 
However, the literature on exit strategies is sparse. The main contributions are from 
practitioners (Peters, 2009; McKaskill, 2009) who argue for the need for an exit-centric 
approach to investing in which the exit is considered at every stage in the investment 
process. McKaskill (2009) argues that because the exit is the central event in the entire 
investment process it needs to play a major part in the investment decision. A key 
consideration at the initial screening stage should therefore be who is likely to buy the 
company and how much money will be required to get the business to the point when it 
can be sold. Angel investors also need to raise the necessity for an eventual exit with the 
entrepreneurial team and discuss this with them in the context of their ambitions and 
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aspirations and the realism of their expectations.  At the due diligence stage the priority 
for an exit-oriented investor is to identify any financial or legal issues that would 
complicate an exit.  An exit-oriented approach to investing would also give careful 
consideration to valuation. If the angel investor places too high a value on their 
investment it will not attract an investor at the next round. Exit considerations would also 
dominate the legal stage. Exit strategies should influence the initial term sheet. 
Achieving alignment of interests between the entrepreneur and investor is critical. Both 
will therefore want to structure a deal that offers the most flexibility when it comes to an 
exit, whenever that will be. A key consideration here would be the class of share that 
angels accept. Preferred shares give investors more rights. An exit-oriented investor 
would have regular discussions on the exit strategy after the investment is made (e.g. at 
every board meeting) and would put in place various actions to facilitate a sale, such as a 
due diligence file for prospective purchasers. 
 
Crafting an exit strategy should be done long before the need arises (Kensinger et al, 
2000).  Investors therefore also need to decide on whether to prepare their business for a 
financial or strategic exit. A successful financial exit requires that the business has 
achieved significant size and growth and is capable of further increasing revenue and 
profits. This takes time and money, which reduces the return, the business has to 
overcome the challenges of growth and the risks of failure increase. A strategic exit, in 
contrast, involves assigning value on the basis of future profits achieved by a buyer who 
is able to exploit the assets, competences or capabilities of the business being acquired to 
generate significant revenue opportunities or solve a threat. Hence, it may not matter 
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whether the business has achieved profitability. A strategic exit requires the 
identification of at least one, and ideally several, businesses that might want to buy the 
investee business, understanding why such businesses would want to make the 
acquisition and positioning the business in such a way that it comes to the attention of 
potential acquirers. Setting up commercial relationships with such companies is often a 
means of creating a clear path to a strategic sale (McKaskill, 2009).  
 
Peters (2009) has advocated an ‘early exits’ strategy, arguing that the interests of angels 
and venture capital funds have become increasingly divergent. He therefore recommends 
that angel investors should focus on early stage businesses with limited capital 
requirements that have the prospects of being sold in an M&A deal for less than $30m in 
three or four years. Although the returns will be smaller, there is less risk and dilution, 
hence the overall portfolio returns will be greater. Recent evidence (Geron, 2014) shows 
that not only are most exits small (less than $5m) but also the highest multiples were for 
companies that raised less than $3m and between $5 and $10m, confirming that angel 
investors can generate solid returns by investing smaller amounts at lower valuations. 
 
It is likely that the investor will bring the strategic sale opportunity to the attention of the 
entrepreneur. However, even if the entrepreneur sees the possibility of a strategic sale 
they are unlikely to have the knowledge or skills to execute it. The investor and 
entrepreneur therefore need to work together to build the investment case, identify the 
strategic value, select potential strategic buyers, work out a possible exit value and then 
determine what needs to be done to prepare the business for sale (McKaskill, 2009). 
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An exit oriented approach to investing also has implications for portfolio management. It 
is inevitable that angels will have within their portfolios companies that are likely to fail, 
companies that will continue to trade but will not generate a profitable exit (the ‘living 
dead’) as well as those that offer good prospects of achieving a successful exit. There is 
an emerging realisation that successful angel investing is about minimizing the losses as 
much as maximizing the gains. Two particular strategies are critical. The first is to have 
‘good’ failures, by which it is meant that angels must adopt tactics that minimise the 
losses when an investee company is closed down. Outcomes that are worse than simply 
losing all their money are (i) failures in which the investor also has to cover the costs of 
winding down the venture and paying accountants to provide the financial accounting 
needed for the investor to take his/her tax deduction; (ii) ongoing litigation expenses 
even after the investee company has no value; and (iii) reputational damage arising from 
broken relationships with co-investors and adverse media coverage (Ohio TechAngels, 
2009). 
 
The second requirement is to ‘fail fast’. A big dilemma for angels concerns those 
companies in their portfolio that are underperforming but not failing – the so-called 
‘living dead’. These are companies that have not realised their initial promise of value 
creation but neither are they likely to fail. They are making a little money which is just 
enough to keep the entrepreneur’s dream alive but there is no possibility that it will 
generate returns to their investors. Moreover, the entrepreneurs do not want to give up 
because of what they have invested financially and emotionally. A key requirement is 
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therefore for angels to be able to recognise the symptoms of a  ‘living dead’ investment 
at an early stage and take appropriate action – sell it, merge with a competitor, turn it 
over to the management or simply close it down (May and Simmons, 2001). Managing 
‘living dead’ investments has attracted surprisingly little attention in the venture capital 
literature (Ruhnka and Feldman, 1992) and none in the business angel literature.  
 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The study is based on 21 semi-structured interviews with the manager - often termed the 
‘gatekeeper’ (Paul and Whittam, 2010) - of 18 angel groups based in Scotland and also 
Halo of Northern Ireland. In three groups the gatekeeper role was shared by two 
individuals. In two cases the individuals were interviewed separately. In the third case 
both gatekeepers were present at the interview. The groups that were interviewed 
included all 16 that were publicly listed as members of LINC Scotland at the time, the 
business angel trade association.
2
 Two other groups that are not members were also 
interviewed. All interviews were transcribed.  
 
The focus on angel groups reflects the transformation of the angel market since the 
1990s from one in which angels operated anonymously, investing for the most part on 
their own or with small groups of friends and business associates in ventures that they 
came across through personal social and business networks to the present situation in 
which angels have recognized the advantages of organising themselves into groups to 
invest collectively (Mason, 2006; Sohl, 2007; 2012; Ibrahim, 2008; Gregson et al, 2013;  
                                                 
2
 All the significant angel groups operating in Scotland are publicly-listed members of LINC Scotland. 
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Mason et al, 2013).  The greater investment capacity of angel groups means that they 
now have a significant investment presence in the early stage finance market and have 
been able, to some extent, to close the sub-£2m funding gap created by the decline in 
early stage venture capital funds. With the shift in the approach of governments to the 
‘equity gap’ from establishing public sector financed venture capital funds to the 
creation of co-investment vehicles (Murray, 2007; Mason, 2009), angel groups have also 
become important partners with government.  
 
Angel groups have a variety of operating models. However, the most common is a two-
stage process involving an initial screen which is undertaken by the group’s manager 
(who may be a member of the group or a hired professional), with those opportunities 
which get through the initial screening then considered by the members of the group. 
Those opportunities that attract sufficient interest are then investigated in more detail, 
either by the gatekeeper or by a sub-group of members with relevant sector knowledge. 
It is important to emphasise that the angel group does not invest as an entity: each 
member makes their own investment decision.  Largely unrecognized by scholars, the 
gatekeeper is therefore now a significant actor in entrepreneurial finance, with the power 
to reject investment opportunities and may also present opportunities to group members; 
however, the angels themselves make their own decisions whether to make an 
investment. 
 
In Scotland the initial groups – Archangels and Braveheart – were established in the early 
1990s, preceding the formation of Band of Angels which is the oldest group in the USA.  
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In 2002 membership of LINC Scotland – the trade body for business angels - comprised 
300 solo angels and just these two syndicates which had about 70 angel members 
between them. Ten years later (2012) a total of 24 groups had been created, although 
some subsequently either closed or amalgamated. At this point in time LINC Scotland 
had 19 groups in membership, which it estimates comprised about 700 investors in total. 
Individual membership of LINC Scotland is now below 100. Of the 18 Scottish-based 
angel groups interviewed for this study, nearly one-third (six, or 30%) were three years 
old or less, underlining the recent growth in the formation of syndicates. Membership 
ranges from less than 10 to over 100. 
 
An initial approach was made via an email to the gatekeeper to request an interview. In 
several cases it was not possible to identify the gatekeeper, but in these cases the recipient 
of the email forwarded it to the relevant individual. The interviews included two different 
techniques to collect data. Initially, gatekeepers answered several questions about the exit 
strategy of the groups. Coding of these open questions followed a six-step thematic 
analysis (Howitt & Cramer, 2007) for “identifying, analyzing and reporting patterns 
within data” (Braun and Clarke (2006, p. 79). Subsequently, each respondent completed a 
verbal protocol. This is a technique which involves respondents “thinking out loud‟ as 
they perform a particular task, in this case undertaking the initial screening of a potential 
funding opportunity. The technique has been used successfully to examine the decision-
making process of both venture capitalists and business angels (Hall and Hofer, 1993; 
Zacharakis and Meyer, 1995; Mason and Rogers, 1996; 1997; Mason and Stark, 2004; 
Smith et al, 2010) and has also been applied in a variety of other contexts (see Ericsson 
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and Simon, 1993). However, it is the first time that the technique has been applied to 
angel group gatekeepers. The verbalisations of respondents are recorded, transcribed and 
then the content is analysed by means of a coding scheme devised for the specific 
research questions. The results of this analysis are generally presented as frequency 
counts supplemented by direct quotations.  
 
This methodology provides a more reliable and much richer understanding of the 
decision-making process of investors and the criteria used to evaluate investment 
opportunities than is possible from approaches that use questionnaires, surveys and 
interviews (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1999). People have difficulty in accurately 
recounting their cognitive process in retrospect, hence self-reported, retrospective data 
are subject to conscious or unconscious errors associated with post hoc rationalisation 
and recall bias. There are also cognitive perceptual limitations, with evidence that venture 
capitalists have limited insights into their decision-processes (Zacharakis and Meyer, 
1998; Shepherd, 1999). The consequence is that they often overstate the number of 
criteria actually used, understate the most important criteria and overstate the least 
important criteria (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1999). Hence, as Zacharakis and Meyer 
(1998: 72) note, “past studies provide a laundry list of factors that may be biased in that 
they list a multitude of factors that have a relatively small influence on the decision.” As 
a real-time experiment which does not require investors to introspect about their thought 
processes, verbal protocol analysis sidesteps these recall, post hoc rationalisation and 
cognitive biases (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1999).  
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Nevertheless, verbal protocol analysis has some limitations. First, a frequency count of 
‘thought units’ is an imperfect indicator of the importance of a factor in the final decision 
(Zacharakis and Meyer, 1995). No weightings are placed on the responses to measure 
emphasis and the topics mentioned most frequently are not necessarily those that have the 
ultimate influence on the decision. Nor does it allow for different convincer patterns. In 
other words, people may repeat something several times if they are unsure but say it only 
once if they are absolutely sure. Second, subjectivity is involved in coding, analysing and 
interpreting the transcripts (Riquelme and Rickards, 1992). Third, some respondents may 
be uncomfortable or self-conscious about thinking and speaking out loud which may 
distort their thinking (e.g. resulting in excessive repetition of what they are reading). 
Fourth, it is impossible to entirely remove the effect of the artificiality of the situation. 
Fifth, from a practical point of view it ignores the role of the source of funding 
opportunity which is an important initial influence on the investor’s attitude to the 
opportunity (Hall and Hofer, 1993; Mason and Rogers, 1997). However, Ericsson and 
Simon (1993) argue that verbal protocol analysis is a valuable method of analysing 
decision-making as long as the following criteria are met: the information reported must 
be the focus of attention; the task is not highly routinised by habit; there must be only a 
short time between performance and verbalisation; verbalisation does not require 
excessive encoding; reports are oral; subjects are free from distraction; instructions are 
clear; and completeness in reporting is encouraged. These conditions are all met in this 
study.  
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The focus here, as in previous studies using verbal protocol analysis, is on the initial 
screening stage – the stage when an investor has become aware of an investment 
opportunity and considers it with a view to obtaining sufficient initial impressions to 
decide whether it is worthy of detailed consideration or should be rejected out of hand. 
This stage is done fairly quickly, typically in less than 10 minutes (Sweeting, 1991; Hall 
and Hofer, 1993; Mason and Rogers, 1996; 1997).  The initial screening stage is where 
some 80% to 90% of investment opportunities are rejected (Riding et al, 1993). One 
study of Canadian business angels reported that they accepted just 6% of the investment 
opportunities for detailed consideration (Haines at al., 2003).  As noted earlier, the factors 
which prompt a rejection at the initial screening stage are different to the reasons for 
rejection at later stages in the investment decision-making process (Mason and Harrison, 
1996; Riding et al, 1993; Brush et al, 2012; Mitteness et al, 2012; Carpentier and Suret, 
2013). The novelty of this study is that it uses VPA to examine the initial screening of 
angel group gatekeepers whereas the focus of previous studies was on solo angels.  The 
gatekeeper’s objective in their initial screening is to decide whether the proposal has 
sufficient merit to be of interest to members of the group, balancing the twin 
requirements of providing group members with sufficient deal flow and not wasting their 
time with deals that they regard as being un-investable. 
 
Each respondent was shown a current real investment opportunity which was sourced 
from a business angel network in England. The selection of an English case was intended 
to minimize the risk that the Scottish gatekeepers would be familiar with the business. It 
was given a fictitious name to protect its anonymity. The angels were asked to read the 
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opportunity in the same way that they would normally read an investment proposal but 
verbalise their thoughts as they did so. The instruction that they were given was to say 
out loud the thoughts that came into their mind. Respondents were not required to 
provide any explanations or verbal descriptions (Ericsson and Simon, 1993). One of the 
authors was present as each respondent performed this task and reminded respondents to 
think out loud if they lapsed into silence for more than 10 seconds. A short de-briefing 
session was then carried out with each investor after they had completed the evaluation 
which asked them to reflect on their approach to exits. The locations included the 
gatekeeper’s office, a coffee shop and the researcher’s office.  
 
The verbalisations were recorded and subsequently a complete transcript was made for 
each respondent’s consideration of the investment opportunity. Following the approach 
of Mason and Rogers (1996; 1997) these verbatim transcripts were then broken down 
into short phrases, or ‘thought segments’ – that is, phrases and sentences that are 
independent thought units – to permit analysis. These thought units were then coded into 
one of ten categories relating to different types of investment criteria (Table 1). Both 
authors were involved in triangulating the codings to ensure robustness (Leitch et al, 
2010). The frequency counts for each category of investor were then aggregated and 
compared. Additionally, representative quotes of the identified themes were used to help 
illustrate the results (Ryan and Bernard, 2000). 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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4. EXITS AND FAILURES 
The groups had made surprisingly few exits (Table 2) which is consistent with 
practitioner views that achieving exits is perhaps the biggest challenge facing angel 
investors. Collectively, the groups made 37 exits which represents just 4% of their 
investments. The majority of groups - 12 of the 17 that provided data - have not made any 
exits. Not surprisingly, exits are concentrated amongst the oldest groups (10 years and 
older), with the three longest established groups accounting for 92% of total exits.  
Nevertheless, the small proportion of exits amongst the groups aged five to nine years old 
is clearly apparent, with the vast majority of these groups having not made a single exit. 
The contrast with earlier studies of exits by UK business angels which reported median 
holding periods to exit of four years (Mason and Harrison, 2002) and six years (Wiltbank, 
2010) is striking. Equally surprising, is the low number of failed investments (Table 2). 
These account for 17% of total investments. The three oldest groups account for 82% of 
all losses. Previous studies have reported that the median failed investment emerges after 
two or three years (Mason and Harrison 2002; Wiltbank, 2010).    
 
This admittedly crude data is consistent with both practitioner observations on the 
increasing time required to achieve an exit and the claims that angels do not have 
strategies either for exiting their investments or for managing their ‘living dead’ 
investments. In the next section our interviews with the gatekeepers examines the validity 
of these claims. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
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5. INTERVIEW EVIDENCE  
Direct questioning of the gatekeepers suggests that the vast majority are fairly attuned to 
the need to consider the exit at an early stage in the investment process. Just one stated 
that “I don’t look at exits because they’re so far away. There’s so much we have to do 
between now and when they exit. All I look at is the now and how we can add value and 
build value” (GK18).  When asked what aspects of the exit they consider the other 
gatekeepers reported that key issues were possible buyers (cited by 62% of gatekeepers), 
the likelihood of an exit (48%) and the likely return (38%).  Less frequently mentioned 
issues were timing (29%), route to exit (29%), type of exit (19%) and willingness of the 
entrepreneur to exit (14%). However, they did not expect the entrepreneur to provide a lot 
of detail about exit possibilities in the pitch/business plan, with one saying that “I don’t 
expect it to be fully developed” (GK8). Just over half of the gatekeepers (52%) simply 
wanted to see evidence that the entrepreneur had ‘thought about’ the need for an exit; 
only a minority wanted detail on exit route (24%), likely buyers (19%), returns (19%), 
timing (14%) and willingness to exit (5%). Most gatekeepers agreed that “the 
management have to want an exit” (GK6). In other words, at the investment appraisal 
stage these gatekeepers are simply looking for evidence of an alignment of interests with 
the entrepreneur of the need for an exit: “I would expect there to be something about an 
exit whether it be in the pitch or in the business plan. If it wasn’t there … I would be 
delving in to see if we are aligned…. I think it is very important that we are aligned” 
(GK7). Another observed that “we would only invest if we believed in a viable plan and a 
viable exit plan … [so].. there needs to be some form of exit plan … even if it’s a good 
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investment because you need to know how you’re getting your money out” (GK1). This 
gatekeeper went on to say that an exit plan “would demonstrate that [the management 
team] realize they’re in a capital game rather than a lifestyle business.” Conversely not 
mentioning exits “could be a deal breaker before you even start” (GK6).  
 
Some gatekeepers went further, arguing that an awareness of exit possibilities by the 
management team was a positive signal of its quality. One observed that having an exit 
plan “is a point that says it could be a good team” (GK5). Another commented that if the 
management team “have considered the exit and thought about timescale  … [and] 
they’ve thought who the buyers may be, then yes we are encouraged” (GK7). Another 
noted you would back a management team who had an exit strategy “because you think 
they can deliver not only a product and commercial terms and ultimately an exit” 
(GK17). This was because exit possibilities are “a reflection of market knowledge. It’s 
really important for the team to have that because that will drive all the decisions. They 
should be very much aware of the exit landscape when they’re looking for an initial 
investment” (GK1). In similar vein another gatekeeper argued as follows: “Do they 
understand business? Do they understand what the investors need? If they do then they 
should know who’s acquiring and whose making investments. So I think that shows they 
understand a bit more about the business” (GK19). Naivety about exit options would be 
interpreted negatively by investors – an unrealistic exit plan “loses credibility” (GK2). 
Other gatekeepers gave more emphasis to the sector than the entrepreneur, arguing that 
opportunities for exit overlapped with market factors. “In most sales that we have 
achieved, they have been trade sales … So this goes back to are you operating in the 
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right market place, are there big boys out there that would want small fish to swallow? … 
The more there is a clear market and a niche for … the company to get into, the better the 
chances for an exit at some point” (GK6). 
 
Surprisingly, these views did not translate into a recognition by gatekeepers of the need 
to be pro-active in seeking an exit. Certainly, there was only one gatekeeper who took the 
extreme position that “good investments will find their own exits”. whereas seven 
disagreed (33%), with one stating firmly that “I don’t agree that good investments will 
find their own exits. I think they need to be helped” (GK10). However, the majority 
(62%) were ambivalent, with one stating that although good investments will find their 
own exits “this doesn’t mean you don’t do anything to try to achieve an exit …” (GK17). 
Indeed, most gatekeepers believed that the likelihood of an exit was linked to their value 
added contributions. One gatekeeper argued that “you won’t sell unless you build, so you 
build it and at some point you’ve added enough value that a sale happens” (GK2). 
Another made a similar point: “If you invest to build you’ll get an exit” (GK4) – going on 
to say that “taking the company from now to something better is also building and if 
you’re doing that then you can sell it.” However, this approach contradicts McKaskill’s 
(2009) view on investing for a strategic exit. He argues that any investment in the 
business should be directed towards creating the conditions for an exit and not for more 
product development,  market penetration or any other part of the business concept, none 
of which may be relevant to the buyer’s decision to purchase the business. A rather more 
sophisticated approach with echoes of Peters (2009) was “to fund the company to a value 
inflection point at which we should be able to realize the investment” (GK4).  
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Finally, although about half of the gatekeepers indicated that their group has a strategy 
for dealing with the ‘living dead’ in their portfolio, this did not come through as being 
particularly proactive. Most were aware of the need to have ‘good failures’ as discussed 
earlier. The danger “that you can wind up spending more time with the poor companies 
than you spend with the winners” (GK6) was also recognised. Another commented that 
“if a company does not work that’s the sort of scenario where we might send that back to 
the management team … we have done that on a number of occasions” (GK 4). However, 
it is acknowledged that this will realize just a fraction of the original investment.  
 
6. THE INITIAL SCREENING PROCESS: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EXITS 
We cannot be sure that gatekeepers actually practice what they say they do when 
appraising investment opportunities or even that they are aware of what they do. The 
second stage in the study therefore sought to put gatekeepers in a position where they 
simulate as accurately as possible their approach to appraising investments. The approach 
we adopted is verbal protocol analysis, a technique in which participants are asked to 
‘think out loud’ as they perform a task, in this case the initial screening of an investment 
opportunity. The advantages and disadvantages of this methodology were discussed 
earlier. Gatekeepers were asked to discuss a real investment opportunity that was 
provided by an English business angel network. Given the importance of ‘investor fit’ 
(Mason and Rogers, 1997) one of the challenges with this methodology is finding a 
sufficiently general case that is likely to appeal to a wide range of investors. The case was 
a medical instruments company at the pre-revenue stage with proprietary IP that had 
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£100,000 of equity committed and was looking to raise a further £500,000. We changed 
the name of the business to preserve its confidentiality. In order to avoid it being rejected 
simply on the basis of its location we asked investors to make the assumption that its 
location was ‘nearby’. Given our focus on the exit it should be noted that the investment 
proposal contained a short sub-section on exit strategies (4 lines in a 7 page document). 
 
As described earlier, the transcripts were divided into discrete thought units. Each of 
these though units was then classified where possible on the basis of the specific 
investment criterion. Eight codes related to specific investment criteria and two other 
codes were used when the thought unit referred to an action or to something other than an 
investment criterion. Each of the eight investment criteria was further sub-divided. 
 
The first level coding revealed the breadth of the screening process, with no factor 
accounting for more than 16% of thoughts. As previous studies have noted, investors 
focus on a much smaller number of criteria when considering those opportunities that 
pass the initial screening stage (Mason and Harrison, 1996; Feeney et al, 1999).  In 
previous studies of angel decision-making using VPA, financial considerations, market 
and the entrepreneur/management team have consistently been the top three criteria 
(Mason and Rogers, 1997; Mason and Stark, 2004; Smith et al, 2010). In this study 
financial considerations is also the most significant criterion and markets is also in the top 
three. However, gatekeepers give greater emphasis to the attributes of the business 
(ranked 2
nd
) and slightly less emphasis to the entrepreneur/management team (Table 3). 
The exit, which did not have a separate coding in previous studies because it was not 
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discussed, attracted comments from 15 gatekeepers. These comments accounted for just 
4% of the total, the lowest of all of the identified criteria (Table 3) and a much lower 
level of comment than might have expected from the responses to the direct questions. 
However, there was significant variation between gatekeepers (Figure 1). Two 
gatekeepers were very focused on exits, with this theme accounting for 18% and 20%  
respectively of their comments. In a third case 11% of the gatekeeper’s comments related 
to exits. Indeed, these three gatekeepers accounted for 48% of all the exit-related 
comments. The approach of one of these exit-oriented groups is described as follows: 
“We actually put as much effort into the exit at the investment stage as we do checking 
the business plan…. There is now a three to five page document and that document …. 
identifies the key milestones, not in product development or going to market but in exit 
value….. At those milestones we identify who might be interested in it and why they 
would be interested in it” (GK10).  
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Drilling down to look at the specific aspects of the exit that gatekeepers mentioned (Table 
4) reveals that the highest share of comments related to an exit plan (how to achieve an 
exit), accounting for just over one-third of all comments on exits, and mentioned by just 
over half of all gatekeepers. This is followed by the timing of exit, with 21% of exit 
comments and mentioned by six gatekeepers (29%).  Both the exit value and potential 
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buyers accounted for fewer comments and were mentioned by 19% and 24% respectively 
of gatekeepers. So here again the evidence suggests that gatekeepers were primarily 
interpreting exit information in two ways, firstly, as a source of assurance that their need 
for an exit was matched by the entrepreneur’s recognition that there needed to be an exit 
event if they were to secure investment, and second as one way in which to assess the 
quality of the management team.  For these gatekeepers, as noted above, details were less 
of a concern. Only a minority of gatekeepers actually sought details of how the exit might 
be achieved.  
 
The VPA analysis identified variations in the emphasis that gatekeepers give to the exit 
when they are assessing investment opportunities, suggesting that some gatekeepers are 
more exit-centric than others. This raises two final questions: first, how might this be 
explained; second, is this reflected in exit outcomes?  The average proportion of exit-
related comments in the VPA for all gatekeepers was 5%. This was defined as the 
threshold level for being exit-centric in investment screening. On this basis seven 
gatekeepers were identified as being exit-centric (Figure 1). The three gatekeepers with 
the highest exit-centric scores , and the seventh, were all fairly mature groups (six (2), 
seven and eight years old) but none had achieved any exits. We might therefore speculate 
that their lack of exits which, in turn, can be expected to have resulted in growing 
investor fatigue and difficulties in raising further finance from both existing and new 
members to make new investments, might have prompted a more exit-centric approach to 
investing. Meanwhile, the gatekeepers ranked 4
th
 to 6
th
 in terms of their exit-centricness 
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were the oldest groups, tentatively suggesting that length of time investing, and the 
experience that has been derived, may also lead to greater emphasis on the exit.  
 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
Governments around the world have identified business angels as being a key player in a 
vibrant entrepreneurial ecosystem (OECD, 2011). It is therefore essential that the 
business angel market operates as effectively as possible. This means not only a concern 
about the level of investment activity but also with exit activity. Whereas angel 
investment activity has been stable, or even increased, since the onset of the financial 
crisis (Sohl, 2012; Mason and Harrison, 2015) practitioners report that there is now a 
major problem in achieving exits. This is confirmed by the experience of the angel 
groups in this study even after allowing for the youthfulness of several of them. The lack 
of exits, in turn, has a negative impact on future angel investment activity. However, this 
issue has been ignored by researchers who have continued to focus on investment 
decision-making and, to a lesser extent, investor- entrepreneur relationships. Meanwhile, 
policy-makers regard the number of investments arising from their initiatives as their 
measure of success. 
 
In the context of a growing interest in the exit in entrepreneurship literature this paper has  
investigated the exit-orientation of angel groups in Scotland and Northern Ireland, 
examining the approach of their gatekeepers to the investment process, and linking this, 
albeit tentatively, to actual exit activity. Angel investing is becoming increasingly 
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concentrated amongst angel groups as individual angels recognise the benefits of 
investing with others in structures with a professional approach to investing.  We find 
that most angel gatekeepers do not adopt an exit-centric approach to their investment 
decision-making. Although most say that they consider the exit when they invest this is 
largely to ensure alignment of interest with the entrepreneur for the need for a future exit. 
Gatekeepers are not seeking a detailed exit strategy, nor do they expect one to be in place 
prior to investing. Moreover, except for a handful of gatekeepers exit issues did not loom 
large in their screening of investment opportunities.  Indeed, few gatekeepers took an 
extreme position. Only one gatekeeper held to the proposition that “good investments 
will find their own exits.”  Most thought that building value would result in an exit. 
However, there was no recognition that financial and strategic exits require different 
strategies (McKaskill, 2009). Moreover, the hands-on activities of some gatekeepers 
could be seen as being potentially prejudicial to achieving a strategic exit. Exit-
centricness amongst gatekeepers was associated with the age of the group and in its most 
extreme form with some well-established groups that have not achieved any exits. It 
would therefore appear that the views of those commentators in the angel community 
advocating the need for an exit-centered approach to investing has achieved limited 
penetration amongst Scottish and Northern Irish angel groups. It also needs to be 
acknowledged that the economic environment since the post-2000 technology crash and 
especially since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 has not been conducive for 
exits. All of this is consistent with the small number of exits that the groups have 
achieved in aggregate.  
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There are also important implications for policy-makers.  The growth of co-investment 
funds around the globe as a means of addressing supply-side gaps in the availability of 
start-up and early growth capital (Mason, 2009; OECD, 2011), an approach which 
Scotland pioneered with the launch of the Scottish Co-Investment Fund (SCIF) in 2003, 
means that achieving exits is now also a significant issue for governments, especially as 
such funds are intended to be evergreen. One of the features of the SCIF was that it 
would be a passive investor, automatically following its investment partners into 
investments that were eligible under the scheme. Although the Fund has representation 
rights on the boards of investee companies it normally does not take these up. The SCIF 
currently has a portfolio of over 600 companies. A key question for the SCIF and its 
political masters - and also for government agencies running coinvestment funds in other 
jurisdictions - is whether it should use its powers to become more proactive in seeking 
exits. But this begs three further questions. What can they do in practice? Would it be 
successful? And would they be willing to make the hard decisions to close down ‘living 
dead’ companies in their portfolio in view of the potential negative political and media 
that such actions would be likely to attract? 
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Table 1. Thought segments classification 
 
Investment  Criteria Description  
1. THE PEOPLE Issues regarding: the entrepreneur, management team, the 
inventor. Their background, experience, qualities, etc. 
  
2. PRODUCT The nature of the product: technical aspects, intellectual 
property protection, competitive advantages, design, etc. 
  
3. MARKET This includes points on market: organization, growth, 
competition, geography, size, etc. 
  
4. BUSINESS PLAN Specific comments on the plan: length, presentation, content 
missing data, etc. 
  
5. EXIT Who? When? How much?  Type of exit. Existence of an exit 
plan 
  
6. FINANCIAL   CONSIDERATIONS Amount of investment, amount raised,  future funding needs, 
valuation, equity share, cash-flows, valuation, etc. 
  
7. INVESTOR ATTRIBUTES Issues regarding investment fit,  investment experience   
8. ATRIBUTES OF THE BUSINESS This includes a broad scope of issues: e.g. strategy, business 
model, risks, operations, time frame, etc. 
  
9. OTHER Comments on any aspects of the business which cannot be 
coded in any other category 
  
10. ACTION Specific comment on what to do next.    
 
 
 
Table 2. Investment outcomes by age of angel group 
 
 
outcome  
Age of group  
Less than five 
years old 
Between five 
and nine years 
old 
Ten or more 
years old 
 Total 
 
Percentages of investments made  
Exits 2.1* 1.1** 17.9 4.3 
Still in the 
portfolio 91.2 83.5 34.9 
 
78.8 
Losses 6.7 15.4 47.2 16.8 
Notes: 
* this was a property business which is an atypical investment for an angel group to make. 
** accounted for by just one group 
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Table 3. Verbal protocol analysis: thought units classified by investment criteria 
Criterion % 
9.       OTHER 0 0% 
5.        EXIT 56 4% 
10.      ACTION 100 7% 
7.       INVESTOR ATTRIBUTES 140 9% 
1.       THE PEOPLE 155 11% 
4.       BUSINESS PLAN 161 11% 
2.       PRODUCT 200 14% 
3.       MARKET 208 14% 
8.       ATTTRIBUTES OF THE BUSINESS 221 15% 
6.       FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS 234 16% 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Mentions of exit by gatekeeper (source: interview survey) 
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Table 4. Types of comments related to exits 
 Aspect of exit comments gatekeepers 
 
 
n % n % 
5A Exit Value 7 13 4 19 
5B Buyer 6 11 5 24 
5C When 12 21 6 29 
5D Exit Plan 19 34 11 52 
5E Exit Other 12 21 6 29 
 Total 56 100% - - 
 
 
 
